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IMPIED LI3TATIONS ON THE DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
ALLAN D. VESTAL* and DAVID L. FosTER**
"The judicial power shall extend . . . to controversies . .. be-
tween citizens of different states... ." U. S. Const. art. III, § 2.
"(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is be-
tween: (1) citizens of different states;.. ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1952).
The grants of power from which the federal courts derive their
diversity jurisdiction are extremely broad. The constitutional lan-
guage seems to indicate that the federal courts could, if given the
power by Congress, exercise jurisdiction over any controversy be-
tween citizens of different states, while the statement presently
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 seems to indicate that, subject to the
jurisdictional amount requirement, the federal district courts have
been given such power.-
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
**Third-year law student, State University of Iowa.
1. See, for example, 26r. Justice Black dissenting in Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific R. R. v. Stude, 346 U. S. 574, 582 (1954), where he states:
Congress has given such courts power to try any case that is (1) a
'civil' action, (2) between 'Citizens of different States', (3) a 'contro-
versy,' and (4) involves a matter which 'exceeds the sum or value of
$3,000 exclusive of interest and costs! . . .
Such a broad generalization is somewhat misleading. See also Mr. Justice
Frankfurter dissenting in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336 (1943).
Of course, there are specific limitations spelled out in statutes and in the
Constitution. For example, suits against a state are not included, U. S. Const.
Amend. XI, and there must be a case or controversy, Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911). The statute indicates that "original" proceed-
ings only are covered. Appeals from state proceedings are not here authorized.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. v. Stude, 346 U. S. 574 (1954) ; Snook
v. Industrial Commission, 9 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Ill. 1934). Compare Range Oil
Supply Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R., 140 F. Supp. 283 (D.
Minn. 1956). For a general discussion of the jurisdiction and judicial power
of federal courts, see Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, § 53 et seq. (2d ed.
1943).
The grant of power found in 28 U. S. C. § 1332 is very close to the
original grant found in the Acts of 1789 at c. 20, § 11, which provided:
That the circuit court shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law
or in equity where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of cost, the
sum of value of Five Hundred Dollars and . . . the suit is between a
citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State...
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GENERAL STATEMENTS
The first problem that arises in an analysis of this particular
area of the law is one of interpretation. Is the legislative grant of
power one to be exercised at the discretion of the federal courts, or
is the exercise of jurisdiction a matter of right with the litigants
concerned? Does a federal court have the right to decline jurisdic-
tion of a particular cause of action simply because it feels that some
other court could handle the case more properly or more expedi-
tiously than could the federal courts? In the early case of Cohens v.
Virginid2 the United States Supreme Court said:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.
We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we
would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we call do
is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to per-
form our duty.3
This quotation seems to reflect the view that if a case falls within
its jurisdiction, a federal court must decide that case. This view~ is
found in cases decided quite recently.4
On the other hand, the federal courts have set out a number of
exceptions to this so-called general rule. The Supreme Court of the
United States has stated that:
Obviously the proposition that a court having jurisdiction
must exercise it, is not universally true; else the admiralty
court could never decline jurisdiction on the grounds that the
litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts ad-
ministering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of
law also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exer-
cise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or nonresi-
dents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more ap-
propriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.'
2. 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
3. Id. at 404.
4. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held
that a federal district court should not decline jurisdiction on the ground
that the same suit might be brought in a state court whose judges are elected
rather than appointed and thus presumably are more responsive to the public.
Romero v. Weakley, 226 F. 2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).
5. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U. S. 413, 422-23(1932).
[ Vol. 41:1
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
In this particular case, not based on diversity of citizenship, a
district court had refused to exercise jurisdiction in an admiralty
suit between foreigners, and on appeal, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed that decision. In Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Com-
pany,6 the Supreme Court in a corporation case7 suggested the
same idea. The Court therein stated:
While the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
rights of the parties, it does not follow that it is bound to exert
that power.... It was free in the exercise of a sound discretion
to decline to pass upon the merits of the controversy and to rele-
gate plaintiff to an appropriate forum.8
A few years later, the Supreme Court of the United States in a
third case referred to the exception to the general rule in an action
wherein there was an attempt to file an original bill in the Supreme
Court of the United Statesf The controversy between Massachu-
setts and Missouri and several citizens of the state of Missouri in-
volved an estate and the taxation of that estate. In discussing
whether the Supreme Court of the United States should exercise
jurisdiction the Court referred to the Cohens case and stated:
We have observed that the broad statement that a court hav-
ing jurisdiction must exercise it ... is not universally true but
has been qualified in certain cases where the federal courts may,
in their discretion, properly withhold the exercise of the juris-
diction conferred upon them where there is no want of another
suitable forum... .. Grounds for justifying such a qualification
have been found in 'considerations of convenience, efficiency,
and justice' applicable to particular classes of cases. 0
The same idea is stated somewhat differently in Meredith v. Win-
ter Haven 1 where the Supreme Court pointed out:
The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of
the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was
6. 288 U. S. 123 (1933).
7. For a discussion of the problem of the supervision of a corporation
by a court not of the state of incorporation, see infra, page 10.
8. 288 U. S. at 130-31.
9. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939).
10. Id. at 19. This case, of course, did not involve diversity jurisdiction.
but it does indicate the existence of implied limitations upon the exercise ofjurisdiction by the federal courts.
The federal courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction in areas other
than diversity cases although apparently having jurisdiction. Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 236 (1943) (discussion of use of extraordinary
remedy for the protection of federal rights). Admiralty courts have on occa-
sion refused to exercise jurisdiction although apparently having it.
For reasons peculiar to the special problems of admiralty... the courts
exercising admiralty ... powers have been permitted at times to decline
to exercise their jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501. 513-
14 (1947).
11. 320 U. S. 228 (1943).
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generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at
their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather than in
the state courts. In the absence of some recognized public policy
or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-
exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of
the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to
decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition
of a judgment .... When such exceptional circumstances are not
present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely
because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or
uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the
state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act.1
These cases suggest that although there are exceptions to the
general rule concerning the exercise of jurisdiction, the district
courts do not have unlimited discretion, i.e., that the district courts
have the right to refuse to exercise jurisdiction only in certain
types of cases and under certain conditions. It is the purpose of
this survey to see if some definite rules can be ascertained concern-
ing the exercise of diversity jurisdiction by the federal courts. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has stated :"3
... a right created by state law and enforceable in the state
courts can also be enforced in the federal courts where the parties
to the controversy are citizens of different states. . . . the basic
premise of federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of the
parties' citizenship is that the federal courts should afford reme-
dies which are coextensive with rights created by state law and
enforceable in state courts.
That is the theory of diversity jurisdiction.
This survey was made to determine whether the remedies afforded
are in fact "coextensive."
CAVEAT
Care must be exercised to differentiate between cases where
federal courts do not have or exercise jurisdiction and cases where
the federal courts refuse as a matter of discretion to give relief on
the merits.1 4 In the first situation the federal courts do not get to
the question of the merits and simply hold that they do not have
12. Id. at 234-35.
13. Dissenting in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336-37 (1943).
14. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to have confused these two concepts
in his dissenting opinion in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336 (1943).
It should be noted, too, that when a federal court is faced with a difficult
problem of state law, that court can hold the case in abeyance while the
state question is determined in an adjudication in the state court. Albertson
v. Millard, 345 U. S. 242 (1953) ; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U. S. 101 (1944) : Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168 (1942) ;
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) ; see also
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940). This idea
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jurisdiction or that they will not exercise their jurisdiction; in the
latter situation the federal courts examine the merits and then refuse
to grant any form of relief. This latter situation is found in a num-
ber of cases in equity before federal courts.
An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district
courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the
determination of courts of equity. . . . Exercise of that discre-
tion by those, as well as by other courts having equity powers,
may require them to withhold their relief in furtherance of a
recognized, defined public policy.... It is for this reason that
a federal court having jurisdiction of the cause may decline to
interfere with state criminal prosecutions except when moved
by most urgent considerations ... or with the collection of state
taxes or with the fiscal affairs of the state .. . or with the state
administrative function of prescribing the local rates of public
utilities... or to interfere, by appointment of a receiver, with
the liquidation of an insolvent state bank by a state administra-
tive officer, where there is no contention that the interests of
creditors and stockholders will not be adequately protected .... 1
In a number of cases the federal courts have declined to assist
the parties litigant because they have found that public policy was
against the enforcement of such rights."0 It seems quite clear that:
was articulated in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943), where
the Court, at page 236, stated:
So too a federal court... may stay proceedings before it, to enable the
parties to litigate first in the state courts questions of state law, decision
of which is preliminary to, and may render unnecessary, decision of the
constitutional questions presented.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U. S. 315, 338 (1943), referred to this doctrine as an "affirmation and not a
denial of federal jurisdiction." But see, Pierce v. Hildebrand, 103 F. Supp.
396 (S.D. Iowa 1952) (court disinssed action after discussion of Pullmfan
case).
15. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 235 (1943).
16. In some rather recent cases the federal courts have decided not to
act because the cases involved state regulations of certain areas of activities.
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), noted in 56 Harv. L. Rev.
1162 (1943), faced with a case invoking the regulation of oil production in
Texas, the Court, at page 318 stated:
... we find it necessary to decide only one [question]: Assuming that
the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a matter of sound
equitable discretion, have declined to exercise that jurisdiction here?
The Court then answered that question in the affirmative. For similar ideas,
see Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943), and Harris v. Connecti-
cut Light and Power Co., 125 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. Conn. 1954).
In a dissenting opinion in the Burford case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
attempted to cast the problem in terms of a diminution of the diversity juris-
diction of the federal courts. An examination of the opinion of the majority
and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas suggest that the Court's
holding is in terms of discretionary refusal to act rather than in terms of a
diminution of jurisdiction.
See also Gray v. Blight, 112 F. 2d 696 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U. S. 704 (1940) ; Meinsen v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 43 F.
Supp. 756 (W.D. Mo. 1942), aff'd, 131 F. 2d 176 (8th Cir. 1942); and
Lauria v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687 (E.D. N.Y. 1917).
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In diversity of citizenship cases federal courts must follow the
conflict of laws rule prevailing in the states in which they sit,
... Federal courts consistently refuse to enforce contracts which
are against public policy of the state in which the court sits."
(Emphasis Supplied.)
It should be understood, however, that this goes to the question of
the relief to be granted and not to the essential jurisdiction of a
federal court in such controversies.
Although this suggested, traditional division is not always easy
to ascertain, and although there may be shadings of grays between
the black and white, nonetheless the division is important. The
courts talk in such terms. More important there is historical justi-
fication for such a distinction, and in such an analysis, because of
stare decisis, one can find a certain measure of predictability.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
In considering the problem of the jurisdiction of federal courts,
one immediately thinks of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'8 and its pos-
sible application. Whether the doctrine of that case embraces juris-
dictional questions is a problem that has perplexed the federal
courts for some time.
Angel v. Bullington,9 arose out of a suit by a citizen of Virginia
against a citizen of North Carolina in a North Carolina state court.
The action was for a deficiency judgment on a note for the purchase
price of land in Virginia, the note being secured by a deed of trust
on the land. The court was faced with the question of the application
of the Erie Railroad doctrine to a jurisdictional question. A North
Carolina statute provided that the holder of such a note "shall not
be entitled to a deficiency judgment.' 0 The state supreme court,
while disclaiming any intention to pass on the plaintiff's argument
that the federal Constitution precluded North Carolina from closing
the doors of its courts to him, ruled that the statute in question de-
prived state courts of jurisdiction over the cause."1 No appeal was
taken by the plaintiff from that dismissal; instead he brought a new
17. Jameson Coal and Coke v. Goltra, 143 F. 2d 889, 895 (8th Cir.
1944). See also Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941) ; Reed v. Kelly, 177
F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135
F. 2d 73, 82 (6th Cir. 1943) (". . . where an agreement, made in one state,
violates public policy of another state in which action is brought, it will not
be enforced either by the courts of the forum or by federal courts sitting
therein.").
18. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
19. 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
20. Id. at 185.
21. P,ullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18. 16 S. S. 2d 414 (1941).
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suit in a federal district court for North Carolina seeking a judg-
ment against the same defendant on the same claim.2 The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the identical issue had been
adjudicated in the state court and that the cause having been barred
there could not be relitigated again in the federal courts. It would
seem that the decision was based upon res judicata, except for cer-
tain language found in the opinion:
What is more important, diversity jurisdiction must fol-
low State law and policy. A federal court in North Carolina,
when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give
that which North Carolina has withheld. Availability of diversity
jurisdiction which was put into the Constitution so as to prevent
discrimination against outsiders is not to effect discrimination
against the great body of local citizens.?
In a dissenting opinion in the Angel case, Mr. Justice Rutledge
pointed out that the decision "rests on an 'and/or' hodgepodge of
res judicata and Erie doctrines."'" It is interesting to note that in
the Angel case the Supreme Court did not feel it necessary to con-
sider the merits of the constitutional question. This would support
the conclusion that the decision is based on res judicata, for if based
on Erie considerations, the validity of the statute and the policy
which it established would be directly in issue.
In spite of the questionable nature of the ruling in the Angel
case, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it feels the
Angel case is controlling on the question of the applicability of state
jurisdictional policy at least in some areas. In three consecutive
cases in Volume 337 of the United States Reports, Ragaii v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,2 5 Woods v. Interstate Real-
ty Co.,2 6 and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co.,2 a state
practice was viewed as limiting the availability of a remedy in a
federal court. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented indicating his belief
that the decisions carried Erie Railroad to unintended and un-
justifiable lengths.2 -8
The effect of these Supreme Court decisions is well illustrated
by a series of cases in the Seventh Circuit's Court of Appeals, all of
which involve statutes denying jurisdiction to state courts over
actions for wrongful deaths occurring outside the states, when such
22. 330 U. S. at 185.
23. Id. at 192.
24. Id. at 201.
25. 337 U. S. 530 (1949).
26. 337 U. S. 535 (1949).
27. 337 U. S. 541 (1949).
28. Id. at 557.
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actions could be maintained where the tort was committed.2 1' In
Stevenson v. Grand Trunk Western Ry.,30 decided before Angel v.
Bullington, it was held that such a statute did not affect jurisdiction
of a federal district court in a diversity case. After the Angel deci-
sion was handed down, Davidson v. Gardnert held that the Stcvenl-
son case was still controlling and that the contrary remarks in
Angel v. Bullington were mere obiter.2 In 1950, however, after the
Ragan, Cohen and Woods cases were decided, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Court of Appeals reversed its position and held that the
federal district court could not entertain such an action. 3 In de-
fending their new view against the oft-made argument that a state
statute cannot control the jurisdiction of federal courts2 4 the Court
of Appeals' opinion pointed out "implicit in the diversity statute, is
the limitation resulting from the Supreme Court's interpretation
of diversity jurisdiction. . . If, as has been suggested, diversity
jurisdiction has leen limited, that limitation arises not from the
action of the state but exists inherently in the federal statute itself
as authoritatively interpreted." ' - It would thus appear that at least
in this case of a state created remedy the state jurisdictional limita-
tion was held to be controlling.
This does not, however, definitely answer the question of the
application of Erie Railroad to all jurisdictional problems which
may arise in the federal courts. Is it proper to conclude that when-
ever a state court would exercise jurisdiction the federal courts
under Erie Railroad and the Angel case must also exercise jurisdic-
tion, or can we in fact find diversity situations where implied
jurisdictional limitations are applied regardless of the state prac-
tice? In other words, are there certain exceptions to the Eric Rail-
road doctrine? There are certain areas that should be examined to
establish definitely the federal pattern of conduct.
FORUM1 ,NON CONVENIENS
One of the developing doctrines in this general area is that of
forum non conveniens which, broadly defined, means that an in-
29. It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that the Supreme
Court of the United States in a later case held such a statute unconstitutional
as violative of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. First
National Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U. S. 396 (1952).
30. 110 F. 2d 401 (7th Cir. 1940).
31. 172 F. 2(1 188 (7th Cir. 1949).
32. Id. at 190.
33. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. R., 183 F. 2d 640 (7th
Cir. 1950).
34. See, for example. Hyde v. Stone, 61 U. S. (20 How.) 170 (1857)
Davidson v. Gardner, 172 F. 2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1949): and Stephenson
v. Grand Trunk. 110 F. 2d 401 (7th Cir. 1940).
35. 183 F. 2d. at 644.
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convenient forum will not exercise jurisdiction. The classic ex-
ample of a forum non conveniens situation is where both litigants
are nonresidents. 6 The rationale behind the doctrine is that there
is a more convenient forum for the vindication of the rights of the
parties and that therefore the instant court should not exercise
jurisdiction. The exact limitations of the doctrine are not clear."
A number of state courts have adopted forum non conveniens and
some federal courts have applied it in diversity cases.3
One of the most troublesome problems involved in the applica-
tion of forum non conveniens in federal courts involves the inter-
relation of the doctrine with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. Among
many cases recognizing the problem is Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"
where Judge Clark stated for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
WVe are clear, however, that New York law should not con-
trol in this situation. It is true that in Weiss v. Routh, [ 149
F. 2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945) ], the court looked to New York law for
light as to the extent to which courts would interfere with the
internal management of a corporation. But that appears to us
much nearer substantive law-that of corporate supervision-
than is this question of the place of enforcement of a claim for
money damages, and hence much closer to that mystic line past
which we dare not venture without state tutelage.
It might be thought that the case of Angel v. Bullington and the
others of that line40 had solved this problem of Erie and forum
non conveniens but at least they have not been so considered by the
circuits. In Sleridan v. American Motors Corporation,4 the state
law was applied on the authority of the Weiss case which, as %%ill
be seen,42 had been effectively overruled in its own circuit. On the
other hand, in Josephson v. McGuire,43 judge Wyzanski said in a
forum non conveniens case:
And though it nmay be that this state rule does not govern
a federal court sitting in Massachusetts, the policy expressed in
36. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forums, 60 Harv. L. Rev.
908 (1947).
37. See, for example, Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F. 2d 353
(5th Cir. 1955) ; Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N. J. 301, 104 A. 2d
670 (1954). In the latter case the court applied the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to a controversy between a resident of Alabama and a corporation
originally incorporated in New Jersey and which still retained domicile in
that state. The case is noted in 11 N. Y. U. Intra. L. Rev. 29 (1955).
38. Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., 243 Minn. 58(1954) ; Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380 (1947); Note, Forum Non Conveniens, A Arec Federal Doctrine, 56
Yale L. J. 1234 (1947).
39. 153 F. 2d 883, 885 (2d Cir. 1946).
40. See mspra notes 25 et seq.
41. 132 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Penn. 1955).
42. See text infra at 12.
43. 121 F. Supp. 83 (D. Mass. 1954).
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
state decisions ought not to be regarded as entirely without
weight in the exercise of this Court's discretion.
The application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the
federal courts has been somewhat confused by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
which authorizes the transfer of a case from one district court
to another in the interest of justice. In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,"'
the Supreme Court of the United States considered the application
of this section and its relation to forum non conveniens. In a rather
short opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Minton it was indicated
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is no longer part of the
federal jurisprudence, and that section 1404(a) now stands in its
stead. The Court said:
The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of
forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated
by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer. When the harshest
part of the doctrine is excised by statute, it can hardly be called
mere codification.4 5
In a rather strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Clark, Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas objected to tile interpreta-
tion placed upon section 1404(a) by the majority.46
It seems entirely possible that section 1404(a) has for all prac-
tical purposes excised forum non conveniens from federal juris-
prudence. Perhaps it has the effect of overriding Eric Railroad v.
Tompkins, and the application of the forum state's doctrine of
forum non conveniens. This would mean that forum non conveniens
is no longer an implied limitation upon the exercise of jurisdiction
by a federal court and that the only question now is whether a
federal court should exercise its power under 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a)
to transfer the case to another district court.4 7
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
At one time the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
• . . a court-state or federal-sitting in one State will as a
general rule decline to interfere with or control by injunction or
otherwise the management of the internal affairs of a corporation
44. 349U. S. 29 (1955).
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F. 2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1956) ; Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F. 2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955). On the
question of the law which should be applied in a case transferred under
section 1404(a) see Hedrick v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 182 F. 2(d
305 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflicts of Laws,
22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 405 (1955) ; Currie, The Erie Doctrine and Transfer
of Civil Actions, 17 F. R. D. 353 (1955) ; Comment, Section 1,104(a) and
Transfers of Substantive Law. 60 Yale L. J. 537 (1951).
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organized under the laws of another State but will leave con-
troversies as to such matters to the courts of the State of
domicile.48
This statement was made in deciding a suit brought by certain stock-
holders of a corporation organized in the state of New Jersey. The
action was commenced in a New York state court and removed to
the United States District Court. That court refused to exercise
jurisdiction because of the nature of the action. On appeal to the
court of appeals it was reversed; the Supreme Court ordered the
decree of the district court to be reinstated. This would support the
idea that the federal courts are limited jurisdictionally because of the
rule against interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign cor-
poration.
In the case of Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Company,40 the mere
fact that the internal affairs of a corporation or concern were in-
volved was evidently deemed sufficient to justify a district court's
refusal to take cognizance of the case. In Alm v. American Hair and
Felt Company"0 the court of appeals noted that:
We are convinced that the controlling issue, and in fact the
only issue, here presented must turn upon whether the acts
complained of concerned only the management and internal af-
fairs of appellee, a foreign corporation. That question must be
answered in the affirmative.
But the rule has not been maintained in its pristine simplicity. In
Williams v. Green Bay & Western R.R.,5' the district court's
dismissal, affirmed in the court of appeals, was set aside, on the
ground that there were no real problems existing which would
justify refusal of the case since forum non conveniens was designed
as an instrument of justice. In the most recent Supreme Court case,
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company 2 the majority
speaking through Mr. justice Jackson declared:
There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal
of a suitor from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will
involve issues which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation. That is one, but only one, factor which may show
48. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130 (1933). On the
general topic of intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation,
see Note, Jurisdiction of Actions Involving Internal Affairs of Foreign
Corporations, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 90 (1956).
49. 288 U. S. 123 (1933). For an example of the rigidity of the earlier
decisions, particularly the views of the circuit courts of appeal, see William-
son v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 56 F. 2d 503 (7th Cir. 1932).
50. 91 F. 2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1937).
51. 326 U. S. 549 (1946).
52. 330 U. S. 518, 527 (1947). And see the recent case, Clifton Park
Manor v. fason, 137 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1955).
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convenience of parties or witnesses, the appropriateness of trial
in a form familiar with the law of the corporation's domicile,
and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted. But the
ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of
the parties and the ends of justice.
Whatever the import of previous decisions, the Koster case
makes it very clear that the refusal to take jurisdiction of such cases
is based upon the broad concept of forum non conveniens. From this
observation, two important consequences appear to follow. First,
a federal court probably is no longer justified in dismissing a suit
because it involves the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. rhe
remedy in such situations is transfer under section 14 04 (a) since
that section replaces the common law concept of forum non con-
veniens for the federal courts. And it would seem to follow that the
statutory provisions are not limited by the old circumscriptions utpon
forum non conveniens because the harshness of dismissal is no
longer present.13 Second, there is some confusion about the integra-
tion of the foreign corporation limitation and Erie Railroad con-
siderations. It seems quite clear that the federal courts have not
definitely decided this particular problem. This is amply illustrated
by the decisions in the Second Circuit. In Weiss v. Routh," Judge
Learned Hand noted that there was a good deal of discretion in the
court in these cases but that :
.. although judicial discretion (toes indeed imply that the limits
are not rigidly fixed, it (toes not mean that there are none: and
in dealing with the question at bar, we are to remember the puir-
pose of conformity in 'diversity cases'. '"
Although this appeared to have settled the questions for the Second
Circuit's Court of Appeals, the calm was short-lived, for a few
months later in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Comnpany 5": it was held that New
York law was not controlling in determining whether federal district
courts in New York should exercise jurisdiction in an action for
negligent destruction of property by a Virginia resident against a
53. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29, 32 (1955), where it i-
said:
The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of fortim iit,:
conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision ill
1404(a) for transfer. When the harshest part of the doctrine is excised
by statute, it can hardly be called mere codification. As a consequence, we
believe that Congress, . . . intended to permit courts to grant tranlsfcr
upon a lesser showing of convenience.
However, a dissenting opinion in the Norwood case indicates that the linita-
tions placed upon forum non conveniens by Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947), and by Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Co., 330 U. S
501 (1947), should apply to transfers under section 1404 (a).
54. 149 F. 2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945).
55. Id. at 195
56. 153 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946). This decision wa,; reversed in 330
U. S. 501 (1947).
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Pennsylvania corporation, which had filed certificates for doing
business in New York and Virginia. The Weiss case was distin-
guished on the ground that the instant case did not involve the
internal affairs of a corporation. Just a few pages later in the same
report, a footnote in an internal affairs case, Koster v. Lumberniens
Mutual Casualty CompanyU7 declared that New York law was not
controlling and cited the Gulf case as authority. To add insult to
injury the original Weiss case was cited in the body of the Koster
opinion, but was omitted in that particular footnote. Both the Gulf
and Koster cases went up to the Supreme Court and in both of them
the Erie question was avoided. 58 The same question had been left
open earlier in Williams v. Green Bay and Western R.R.59 On the
particular question of the application of Eric Railroad to internal
affairs of foreign corporation cases, as in the related, broad question
of forum non conveniens, there has been no definitive ruling.
PROBATE PRACTICE
One of the most widely stated generalizations in the area of
federal jurisdiction is that federal courts can exercise no probate
jurisdiction. Statements have been made to that effect in approxi-
mately 250 reported federal cases. The holdings of the cases, how-
ever, do not support the generalization. To understand the vast
body of case law on the subject, it is necessary to classify the cases
into specific areas where a more or less common problem is to be
found. When such categories are recognized, the opinions become
more meaningful and the state of the law more understandable.
It is clear from a multitude of decisions that federal courts will
take cognizance of actions at law, or in proper cases, of suits in
equity, to establish a claim against an estate of a decedent, even
though that estate is already in the hands of a state court. And the
federal courts will exercise jurisdiction at any time before a final
decree is made in the state proceedings. 60 There are, however,
57. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 153 F. 2d 888 (2d Cir.
1946).
58. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518. 5-9(1947). The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, and as to the standards that guide dis-
cretion is, so far as here involved, the same as the federal rule. ... It would
not be profitable, therefore, to pursue inquiry as to the source from which
our rule must flow. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 509 (1947).
59. 326 U. S. 549, 559 (1946).
60. Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490 (1946) ; Ingersoll v. Coram. 211
U. S. 335 (1908); Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215 (1892); Blark v.
Bever, 139 U. S. 96 (1891) ; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73 (1885) ; Payne
v. Hook, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 425 (1869) ; Green's Adm'rix v. Cregihton, 64
U. S. (23 How.) 90 (1859) ; Suydam v. Broadnax and Newton. 39 U. S. (14
Pet.) 67 (1840) ; Foster v. Carlin, 200 F. 2d 943 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Rosenberg
v. Baum, 153 F. 2d 10 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Miami County Nat'l Bank v. Ban-
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limitations upon the prosecution of suits in federal courts to estab-
lish claims against an estate, these limitations stemming from the
hesitancy of the courts to interfere with property in the control of
a state tribunal.6 Thus, in the case of creditors, the holding is
uniform that levy of execution on a federal court judgment is not
available; the plaintiff must present the judgment to the probate
court for payment.62 In suits by an heir at law, although an account-
ing may be ordered if necessary to determine his share in the
estate, 63 the federal courts will refuse to order an accounting which
looks only to distribution of the estate. 64 A fortiori, the federal courts
will not order an actual distribution when the property is in the
hands of a state court.6
croft, 121 F. 2d 921 (10th Cir. 1941) ; O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F. 2d 147 (8th
Cir. 1927) ; Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sayles, 11 F. 2d 948 (1st Cir. 1926) ; United
States v. Swanson, 75 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1947) ; American Baptist Home
Mission Soc'y v. Stewart, 192 Fed. 976 (C.C. N.D. W. Va. 1911). The case
of Miami County Nat'l Bank v. Bancroft, supra, indicates that such suits can
be maintained concurrently with equivalent suits in state courts. A con-
trary result was reached in DuVivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 125 (1874).
The traditional jurisdiction of equity courts in this area is based upon a trust
theory. See Underground Electrical Rys. v. Owsley, 176 Fed. 26 (2d Cir.
1909).
61. In some cases the federal courts have examined the state practice
to ascertain whether such a suit would be cognizable in a court of general
jurisdiction within the state. McCan v. First Nat'l Bank, 139 F. Supp. 224(D. Ore. 1954) ; Sowls v. First Nat'l Bank, 54 Fed. 564 (C.C.D. Vt. 1893).
Similarly, it has been held that a federal court could not compel the surviv-
ing partner of deceased to render an accounting where, under the state
practice, the probate court had jurisdiction of all such accountings. Moore
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 138 Fed. 1 (3d Cir. 1905). The better view, however.
would seem to be that if the suit falls under one of the traditional heads of
equity jurisdiction, the controlling question is whether the possession of the
state court would be obstructed. If the state court's possession would be
interfered with, the mere fact that a similar action could be maintained in a
court of general jurisdiction within the state will not justify an exercise ofjurisdiction by a federal court. Robinson v. Georgia Say. Bank & Trust Co.,
106 F. 2d 944 (5th Cir. 1939) ; In re McDonald's Estate, 42 F. 2d 266 (D.
Minn. 1930).
62. Yonley v. Lavender, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 276 (1874) ; Thiel Detec-
tive Service Co. v. McClure, 130 Fed. 55 (C.C. W.D. Ky. 1904) ; Pufahl v.
Estate of Parks, 299 U. S. 217, 226 (1936) (dictum) ; Bedford Co. v. Thom-
linson, 95 Fed. 208, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1899) (dictum). But cf. Borer v. Chap-
man, 119 U. S. 587 (1886) (creditor can follow property into hands of
legatees through action in federal court) ; Elliott v. Shuler, 50 Fed. 454
(C.C. W.D. N.C. 1892) (particular remedy created by state statute)
Brown v. Ellis, 86 Fed. 357 (C.C.D. Vt. 1898) (semble).
63. Payne v. Hook, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 425 (1869).
64. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33
(1909) ; In re McDonald's Estate, 42 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Minn. 1930).
65. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608 (1893) ; Hastings v. Douglass, 249
Fed. 378 (N.D. W. Va. 1918) ; Northrup v. Browne, 204 Fed. 224 (8th Cir.
1913). But cf. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910).
This hesitancy to interfere with property in the hands of another court
has also led to a refusal to set apart a widow's statutory year's support.
In re Seabolt, 113 Fed. 766 (W.D. N.C. 1902) ; cf. McCan v. First Nat'l
Bank, 139 F. Supp. 224 (D. Ore. 1954) (jurisdictional restrictions of Oregon
state law viewed as controlling).
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A really difficult problem in this area is that of whether a federal
court of equity would entertain a suit for accounting and distribu-
tion on removal from a state probate court after letters testamentary
had been issued by that court. The most analogous case presented
thus far was decided by a circuit court in 1893, but the opinion
entered there is anything but exhaustive. 6 It is believed that the
appropriate action for a federal court in such a case would be to
reject jurisdiction, perhaps on the ground of limited authority to
exercise control over officers appointed by another court. In any
event, 7 the situation set out above might test the extent to which
federal courts are willing to go in rejecting jurisdiction over the
estates of decedents.
A second group of cases is that in which a personal judgment
against an executor or administrator is sought in a federal court.
The cases which have sometimes resulted in a refusal to exercise
jurisdiction are those in which there has been no final accounting
in the estate.6 Federal courts have not hesitated to go behind a
fraudulent final accounting to impose liability upon the estate repre-
sentative.69 A clear distinction has been made between the two
situations.7 0 It is submitted that the cases in this group can best be
explained on the basis of the rule which prevents one court from
taking jurisdiction of a cause which involves interference with
property in the hands of another court, or alternatively, which in-
volves control of officers of another court."' Although many of the
66. Sowles v. First Nat'l Bank, 54 Fed. 564 (C.C.D. Vt. 1893).
67. Where an action by a husband claiming his deceased wife's estate
was removed to federal court, the cause was remanded when administration
proceedings were started even though the federal court felt it had jurisdiction
otherwise. Peterson v. Deminer, 34 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1940).
68. In the following cases there had been no final accounting and juris-
diction was declined: Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F. 2d 263 (1st Cir. 1942) ;
McCrory v. Harp, 31 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. La. 1940); Tussing v. Central
Trust Co., 34 F. 2d 312 (ED. Mich. 1929).
69. In the following cases there had been a final accounting, and juris-
diction was taken: Lathan v. Edwards, 121 F. 2d 183 (5th Cir. 1941);
Bertha Zinc Co. v. Vaughan, 88 Fed. 566 (C.C. W.D. Va. 1898) ; Pratt v.
Northam, 19 Fed. Cas. 1254, No. 11,376 (C.C.D. R-I. 1828).
70. The distinction has been made from a very early date. Thus in
Mallett v. Dexter, 16 Fed. Cas. 542, No. 8,988 (C.C.D. R.L 1852), where a
bill against an administrator sought to open certain accounts which lad been
settled in probate court upon grounds of fraud, and also to require an ac-
count of assets not embraced therein, an accounting was ordered as to those
matters which had been finally settled in probate court but not as to the
matters not embraced in the previous accounting. As might be expected a
federal court will not order an executor or administrator to turn over funds
held for distribution to a representative of the estate appointed by anotherjurisdiction. Watkins v. Eaton, 183 Fed. 384 (2d Cir. 1910) ; Graham v. Ly-
brand, 142 Fed. 109 (7th Cir. 1905) ; Hale v. Coffin, 114 Fed. 567 (C.C.D.
Me. 1902).
71. See Tussing v. Central Trust Co., 34 F. 2d 312 (E.D. Mich. 1929).
Although one recent case appears to take the position that the controlling
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decisions in this area have been difficult, the conflicts are not based
upon disagreement as to probate jurisdiction, but rather upon such
considerations as the realty of the possession of the state court or the
official nature of the person.7 2 The only Supreme Court case in-
volving an attempt to get a personal judgment against an executor
or administrator resulted in a declining of jurisdiction, but the
Court in that case treated the problem in large measure as one of
impinging upon the jurisdiction of another court, since no final
accounting had been made to the state tribunal.73
A third group of cases presents the problem of an attack tpon a
completed administration on the ground of fraud. It is in this area
that the federal courts have most needlessly entwined themselves in
reams of dicta concerning limitations on probate jurisdiction. Three
cases are in large measure responsible for the confusion.
In 1844 the case of Gaines v. Chew4  came before the Supreme
Court, involving the probate of a will, executed in 1811, in a
question is whether a similar action could be maintained in a state court of
general jurisdiction, it is submitted that the last two paragraphs indicate
that the true basis for the decision is interference with the possession of an-
other court. See McCan v. First Nat'l Bank, 139 F. Supp. 224 (D. Ore.
1954), especially at page 228. Another factor which is sometimes found in
these cases is concurrent suits involving the same questions in state and federal
courts. See Vanderwater v. City Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. III. 1939).
72. See Herron v. Comstock, 139 Fed. 370, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1905)
(discussion of whether state court had possession).
73. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456 (1939).
74. 43 U. S. (2 How.) 619 (1844). An interesting book has been writ-
ten on the litigation over the estate of Daniel Clark, in which Gaines v. (he'
is a step. Harmon, The Famous Case of Myra Clark Gaines (1946). For
other decisions in the controversy, which extended over a period of more than
fifty years, see Ex parte Whitney, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 404 (1839) ; Gaines v.
Relf, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 9 (1841) ; Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U. S. (6 How.)
550 (1848) ; Gaines v. Relf, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 472 (1851) ; Succession of
Clark, 11 La. Ann. 124 (1856) ; Clark v. Gaines, 13 La. Ann. 138 (1858) ;
De la Croix v. Gaines, 13 La. Ann. 177 (1858) ; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U. S.
(24 How.) 553 (1861) ; Gaines v. New Orleans, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 642(1868) ; Gaines v. Lizardi, 154 U. S. 555 (1868) ; Gaines v. De la Croix, 73
U. S. (6 Wall.) 719 (1868) ; Gaines v. Lizardi, 9 Fed. Cas. 1039, No. 5,174
(C.C.D. La. 1870) ; Gaines v. New Orleans, 9 Fed. Cas. 1051, No. 5,177(C.C.E.D. La. 1871) ; Fuentes v. Gaines, 9 Fed. Cas. 973, No. 5,145 (C.C.D.
La. 1871); Gaines v. Mausseaux, 9 Fed. Cas. 1049, No. 5,176 (C.C.E.D. La.
1871) ; Gaines v. Agnelly, 9 Fed. Cas. 1036, No. 5,173 (C.C.E.D. La. 1872)
Fuentes v. Gaines, 25 La. Ann. 85 (1873) ; New Orleans v. Gaines, 82 U. S.(15 Wall.) 624 (1873) ; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1876) ; Smith v.
Gaines, 93 U. S. 341 (1876) ; Gaines v. Lizardi, 9 Fed. Cas 1042, No. 5.175(C.C.E.D. La. 1877); Gaines v. Hammond's Adm'r, 6 Fed. 449 (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1881) ; Davis v. Gaines, 104 U. S. 386 (1881) ; Gaines v. New Orleans.
17 Fed. 16 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883) ; Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395 (1884) ;
Gaines v. New Orleans, 27 Fed. 411 (C.C.E.D. La. 1886) ; Louisiana Bank
v. Whitney, 121 U. S. 284 (1887) ; New Orleans v. Gaines' Adm'r, 131
U. S. 191 (1889); Whitney v. New Orleans, 43 Fed. 215 (C.C.E.D. La.
1890) ; New Orleans v. Gaines' Adm'r, 138 U. S. 595 (1891) ; Seinies v.
Whitney, 50 Fed. 666 (C.C.E.D. La. 1892) ; Goldthwaite v. Whitney, 50 Fed.
668 (C.C.E.D. La. 1892) ; Whitney v. New Orleans, 54 Fed. 614 (5th Cir.
1893).
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Louisiana probate court by means of fraudulent suppression of a
revoking will drafted in 1813. The Supreme Court held that, al-
though a federal court could not set aside the probate of the 1811
-will, they could find the answers to the allegations of fraud, to be
used in evidence in a subsequent proceeding before the state probate
court."5 It seems apparent that the only reason the court did not go
ahead and set aside the judgment was that to do so necessitated a
proof of the validity of the 1813 will as an effective disposition. To
that extent the Court was unwilling to go, and to the same extent
the case represents some authority for the view that federal courts
will not admit a will to probate. Unfortunately, by citing the earlier
case of Tarver v. Tarver76 which did not involve a similar question,
and by discussing English authority, the opinion gave the impres-
sion that the Court would always refuse to strike down a fradulent
judgment of a court of probate. That such an inference was not
intended is indicated by: (1) the fact that the leading English case
cited, Kerrich v. Bransby,7 7 involved a refusal of a chancery court
to set aside a will, the execution of which was procured by fraud as
contrasted with refusal to set aside a fraududent judgment of a
probate court; and (2) the decision of the court to consider the
question of fraud in order to provide evidence for use before the
Louisiana probate court.
The second case of the "unholy three" was Fouvergue v. Afu-
nicipality,78 in which an action was brought to set aside the probate
proceeding conducted more than half a century before the action was
brought. In refusing jurisdiction in such an uncomfortable situation,
the Court cast wildly about and relied on Tarver v. Tarve'r.- The
Court did not distinguish between the validity of the will itself, and
the validity of the probate proceedings.8 0
The third case, Simmons v,. Saul,8 ' relied upon the case of In
re Broderick's Will.82 Insofar as Broderick involved th'e point
75. 43 U. S. (2 How.) at 646, where it is said: "These answers being
obtained may be used as evidence before the Court of Probate to establish the
will of 1813 and revoke that of 1811."
76. 34 . S. (9 Pet) 174 (1835).
77. 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. 284 (H.L. 1727).
78. 59 U. S. (18 How.) 470 (1855).
79. 34U. S. (9 Pet.) 174 (1835).
80. See Fouvergne v. Municipality, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 470, 473(1855) where it is said:
That question, in our opinion, is closed by the decree of the alcalde.
That decree declares the will to be valid and subsisting, and directs its
execution. We are obliged to treat the decree as the judicial act of a court
of competent jurisdiction. In fact, it was the only judicial authority in the
province of Louisiana, except that exercised by the governor.
81. 138 U. S. 439 (1891).
82. 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874).
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
under consideration here, that decision has not been followed. 83
The Simmons case, resting upon an abandoned principle, should
not be viewed as much of a barrier to federal probate jurisdiction.
Insofar as the first two of the above cases refused jurisdiction
because a judgment setting aside the probate would necessitate a
decision as to the validity or invalidity of the will, their correctness
should be assessed by a comparison with the following section on
will contests. But insofar as the three cases are viewed as authority
for the proposition that a probate cannot be set aside on grounds
of fraud perpetrated upon the court, they are completely incon-
sistent with decisions regarding judicial sales8 4 and those indicating
the willingness of the federal courts to go behind a fraudulent final
accounting. 5 An act of the Court invalidating the state judgment
would not necessitate a judgment as to the validity of the will itself,
since there is no reason to assume the will might not again be ad-
mitted in a fair proceeding. In any event, the Court in Gaines v.
Chew adopted a solution which could well have been followed in
the two subsequent cases.
To discuss situations where a party should be permitted to col-
laterally attack a judgment for fraud would go beyond the purposes
of this article. However, it would seem that a federal court should
have the right under the Erie doctrine to apply the laws of the state
concerning collateral attacks upon a probate proceeding. That the
judgment attacked was one of a probate court does not, without
more, provide any basis for declining jurisdiction, and some federal
cases have taken the position that such an attack would lie.80 How-
ever, the confused thinking of the first three cases occasionally per-
sists today.87
83. The Broderick case rejected the attack on the probate on ground.
there was an adequate remedy at law in the state probate court. This is clear-
ly erroneous, since the question should be whether there was an adequate
remedy at law in a federal court. Subsequent decisions involving personal
judgments against administrators (supra note 69) and attacks on judicial
sales (infra note 84), indicate that this aspect of the Broderick case has been
ignored. On the Broderick case generally, see infra note 96 and text sup-
ported thereby.
84. It is clear that a federal court of equity has power to set aside a
fraudulent judicial sale, even though the sale was incident to a probate pro-
ceeding. Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86 (1889) ; Johnson v. Waters,
111 U. S. 640 (1884). However, where the state probate proceedings are still
open, the hesitancy of the federal court to interfere with the administration
will prevent relief. McCrory v. Harp, 31 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. La. 1940) ;
Jordan v. Taylor, 98 Fed. 643 (C.C.D. Mass. 1899). A federal court has
refused to enjoin such a sale. Evans v. Gorman, 115 Fed. 399 (C.C.E.D.
Ark. 1902).
85. Cases cited note 69 supra.
86. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
87. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from profiting by a
fraudulent combination in establishing illegal claims against the estate, by
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The federal courts have frequently refused to adjudicate will
contests both in original actions and upon removal.SS Some of these
cases can be disposed of on such obvious grounds as the fact that
the joinder of indispensable parties would destroy the requisite
diversity 9 or a previous binding judgment of a state court between
the parties on the same issue.90
Aside from standard considerations such as these, the refusal of
some federal courts to take cognizance of will contests seems to
stem from the case of Ii re Broderick's Will 1 In that case, the will
was probated, and the statutory period for attacking the judgment
had run. Long afterwards, an action was brought in federal court
to set aside the probate and declare the will void on grounds the
will was a forgery and its probate was procured by fraud. The
Supreme Court held that there was no federal jurisdiction in the
cause, relying primarily upon authority from the English chancery
courts, especially Kerrick v. Branlsby,92 and Webb v. ClaverdenY
Neither of these cases answered the allegation of fraud in the pro-
curement of the judgment; indeed, it is submitted that the opinion
of the majority did not adequately consider this element of the case,
seemingly holding that federal equitable relief was not available
because it had not been shown that the parties had no remedy in the
state probate court. It would seem that this rationale is faulty in
that the question should be whether an adequate remedy at law was
available in a federal court ;94 in any event, a consideration of this
removing the cloud thereby cast upon real estate inherited by plaintiffs.
McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415 (1905). A recent district court case
appears to allow an attack on fraudulently obtained letters of administration.
Emmerich v. May, 130 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). Such an attack w%-as
also perinitted in Jennings v. Smith, 232 Fed. 921 (S.D. Ga. 1916); but on
appeal the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed. Smith v. Jennings,
238 Fed. 48 (5th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 243 U. S. 635 (1917). This case
illustrates strikingly the injustice which can result from a refusal to takejurisdiction.
88. Porter v. Bennison, 180 F. 2d 523 (10th Cir. 1950). Some decisions
have treated the state practice as controlling. Lee v. Minor, 263 Fed. 507(9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 488 (1920) (jurisdiction taken onbasis of California law) ; Thompson v. Nichols, 254 Fed. 973 (D. hie. 1919)(jurisdiction refused on basis of Maine law) ; cf. Montgomery v. Gilbert, 77F. 2d 39 (9th Cir. 1935) (jurisdiction refused after consideration of Montana
law on collateral attack).
89. O'Brien v. Markham, 17 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Cal. 1936) ; Anderson
v. Appleton, 32 Fed. 855 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1887).90. O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F. 2d 147 (8th Cir. 1927); Spencer v.
Watkins, 169 Fed. 379 (8th Cir. 1909).
91. 88 U. S. (21 WalL) 503 (1874).
92. 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. 284 (H.L. 1727).
93. 2 Atk. 424, 26 Eng. Rep. 656 (Ch. 1742).94. See Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485 (1883), where a suit in equity to
set aside a probate could not be maintained in a federal court, because an
action would lie at law in a federal court.
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case will reveal that this aspect of the Broderick decision has not
been seriously considered in most subsequent decisions." rTwo
members of the court dissented from this facet of the decision in the
Broderick case.
The important part of the Broderick case insofar as subsequent
decisions have been concerned was the Court's explanation of the
refusal of the high courts of chancery to take jurisdiction:
Whatever may have been the original ground of this rule
(perhaps something in the peculiar constitution of the English
courts) the most satisfactory ground for its continued preva-
lence is, that the constitution of a succession to a deceased per-
son's estate partakes, in some degree, of the nature of a pro-
ceeding in rem, in which all persons in the world who have any
interest are deemed parties, and are concluded as upon res
judicata by the decision of the court having jurisdiction.-
Although the court was using this rationale to augment a res judi-
cata argument, it is submitted that this statement, appearing as it
did almost at the beginning of the opinion, became the basis of a
long line of cases considering the nature of the suit proposed ac-
cording to the state practice, and whether the suit was in fact one
inter partes or one in rem. This distinction was expressly made by
the Supreme Court in Farrell v. O'Brien.7 It may have resulted
from an effort on the part of the court to reconcile Broderick with
the apparently conflicting decision of Gaines v. Fuentes.
Not all cases involving will contests have been made to turn
upon a consideration of state practice. In three decisions" the fed-
eral courts have been held to be without jurisdiction on the ground
they have no machinery for recording a will and for administering
a probate proceeding generally. These cases are interesting ones,
because the reasoning therein might possibly be applied to justify
a refusal to take jurisdiction if anyone were so brash as to present
a will to a federal court for probate in the first instance. As applied
to will contests, however, they are not sound, since the will would
still be admitted to probate in the state court; the function of the
federal decision would be to bind the parties in any subsequent pro-
ceedings in the state tribunal.
In any event, it is now well established that in suits involving
will contests, the state practice is viewed as controlling.100 Although
95. See note 83 supra.
96. In re Broderick's Will, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874).
97. 199 U. S. 89 (1905), at 116.
98. 92 U. S. 10 (1875).
99. Copeland v. Bruning, 72 Fed. 5 (C.C.D. Ind. 1896) ; Reed v. Reed.
31 Fed. 49 (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1887) ; Hargroves v. Redd, 43 Ga. 142 (1871).
100. See Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (1918), for an example of the
prevailing approach.
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cases can be found laying down, on a piecemeal basis, rulings for a
number of states,1 1 it is not at all clear what the underlying criterion
is. One principle which seems to have been applied in a number of
cases is simply whether or not an independent action for the contest
of a will could have been maintained in a state court of general
jurisdiction.0 - Although this rule is easy of application, there is no
patent reason why a state should be allowed to defeat the right of
101. Alabama: Mitchell v. Nixon, 200 F. 2d 50 (5th Cir. 1952) (juris-
diction refused).
Arkansas: Wahl v. Franz, 100 Fed. 680 (8th Cir. 1900) (jurisdiction
refused on removal).
Florida: Strickland v. Peters, 120 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1941) (jurisdiction
refused as to wills; taken as to deeds).
Georgia: Meadow v. Nash, 250 Fed. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1918) (jurisdiction
refused on removal where will had not passed through Ordinary's Court) ;
Brodhead v. Shoemaker, 44 Fed. 518 (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1890) (jurisdiction
taken on removal where will had passed the Ordinary, and the caveat was
pending in Superior Court).
Illinois: Williams v. Crabb, 117 Fed. 193 (7th Cir. 1902) (jurisdiction
taken).
Iowa: Wart v. Wart, 117 Fed. 766 (C.C. N.D. Iowa 1902) (jurisdiction
taken).
Kansas: Rice v. Sayers, 198 F. 2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U. S. 877 (1952) (jurisdiction refused).
Louisiana: Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F. 2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U. S. 742 (1945) (jurisdiction taken).
Minnesota: Spencer v. Watkins, 169 Fed. 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
215 U. S. 605 (1909) (jurisdiction taken of suit to have bequest declared
void).
Mississippi: Everhart v. Everhart, 34 Fed. 82 (C.C. S.D. Miss. 1888)(jurisdiction taken of suit to annul a will as muniment of title).
Missouri: Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223, 227 (8th Cir. 1903) (dictum
indicates that jurisdiction will be taken; dismissal on merits). It is sub-
mitted that the new Missouri probate code will also permit a federal court
to exercise jurisdiction. Compare Mo. Ann. Stat § 473.083 (Vernon 1955).
New Hampshire: In re Cilley, 58 Fed. 977 (C.C.D.N.H. 1893) (refusingjurisdiction on petition for removal).
New Jersey: It re Lummis' Estate, 118 F. Supp. 436 (D.N.J. 1954)
(jurisdiction taken on removal).
New York: Quinlan v. Empire Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. N.Y.
1956) (jurisdiction taken).
Oklahoma: Cf. Wilson v. Simler, 350 U. S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
Oregon: Richardson v. Green, 61 Fed. 423 (9th Cir. 1894) (jurisdiction
taken after will had been admitted to probate). But ef. McCan v. First Nat'l
Bank, 139 F. Supp. 224 (D. Ore. 1954) (no jurisdiction of action against
executor for negligence; Oregon law considered).
Rhode Island: Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 34 F. 2d 18,
21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 600 (1929) (dictum indicating that
federal court has no jurisdiction to determine whether trust was properly
authenticated as part of a will). But cf. Illinois State Trust Co. v. Conaty,
104 F. Supp. 729 (D.R.I. 1952) (jurisdiction to determine rights of child not
provided for in maternal grandfather's will).
Texas: Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (1918) (refusing jurisdiction).
Virginia: Guilfoil v. Hayes, 86 F. 2d 544 (4th Cir. 1936), cert denied, 300
U. S. 669 (1937) (jurisdiction refused).
102. Rice v. Sayers, 198 F. 2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 344 U. S.
877 (1952) ; Williams v. Crabb, 117 Fed. 193 (7th Cir. 1902) ; Everhart Y.
Everhart, 34 Fed. 82 (C.C. S.D. Miss. 1888) ; Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed.
223. 227 (8th Cir. 1903) (dictum).
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nonresidents to seek justice in a federal tribunal. A second group
of cases has tended to emphasize a rule based upon whether the
action, in view of the state practice, is a suit between parties, or is
an adjudication in rem establishing the validity of the document
against the world. 103 For the most part, courts have failed to recog-
nize these tests as distinct concepts ;o' and in most cases, the results
are the same. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a suit might be
in rem in the sense used by the courts in these proceedings, and
yet maintainable in a court of general jurisdiction of that state.
It would appear that the second approach has the stronger his-
torical justification. Under the decisions in some early cases, al-
though state practice was considered, jurisdiction was rejected on
the ground that will contests were not suits "at law or in equity"
under the federal law.1" ' Apparently these cases led to a considera-
tion of the jurisdiction of British chancery courts over will con-
tests, ' where much attention was given to whether a suit was really
inter partes. The final step in the development of the rule wva;
evidently the decision that the test was whether a given suit was
one inter partes according to the state practice, and hence a suit
at law or in equity.' Although the second rule has the best logi-
cal basis, it is not easy to apply, since the inter partes concept
does not fall within the traditional in rem-in personani dichoto-
my.'" It would seem that even the second rule allows a state statute
to regulate the jurisdiction of a federal court. This objection is best
avoided by considering the right to maintain a will contest in an
action inter partes as a new right, created by a state, but enforced
in a federal tribunal.
103. Mitchell v. Nixon, 200 F. 2d 50 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Fakouri v. Cadais,
147 F. 2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 742 (1945) ; Strickland v.
Peters, 120 F. 2d 53 (5th Cir. 1941) ; In re Lummis' Estate, 118 F. Supp.
436 (D.N.J. 1954).
104. Richardson v. Green, 61 Fed. 423 (9th Cir. 1894).
105. Wahl v. Franz, 100 Fed. 680 (8th Cir. 1900) ; In re Gilley, 58
Fed. 977 (C.C.D.N.H. 1893).
106. The case of Kerrich v. Bransby, 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep.
284 (H.L. 1727).
107. For an excellent discussion see Spencer v. Watkins, 169 Fed. 379(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U. S. 605 (1909), where Judge Hook says at
page 382:
We think that a controversy like that before us is not one strictly
pertaining to probate and administration, but, on the contrary, has every
element of a plenary suit inter partes, and that it belongs to a class of
which the English courts of chancery were accustomed to take cognizance
as involving the execution of trusts.
See also Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199 (1918) ; Reed v. Reed, 31 Fed. 49
(C.C. N.D. Ohio 1887).
108. Some light was shed on this aspect of the rule by the case of In re
Lummis' Estate, 118 F. Supp. 436 (D. N.J. 1954), where a suit for instruction
regarding an in terrorem clause was held to be in rem, thus justifying service
by mailing, but sufficiently adverse to permit removal to federal court.
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Finally, there are a number of cases that might be grouped to-
gether as suits for construction of a will. It has been well estab-
lished from a very early date that such controversies are not beyond
the jurisdiction of a federal court by virtue of any probate limita-
tions.109 Decisions considering whether a state court of general
jurisdiction could consider such an action probably follow from a
misinterpretation of the federal practice in will contests.1 0 On the
other hand, strong justification can be made for the now well-
established rule that a judicial construction of the will by a state
court of competent jurisdiction determines the extent and character
of the interests taken by the devisees and legatees regardless of any
questions of res judicata."'
From the above discussion it can be seen that, although there
may be some hazy areas, the federal courts do, in fact, exercise
jurisdiction in cases that apparently concern probate matters.
DomESTIc RELATIONS
The broad and somewhat unclear topic of federal jurisdiction
and domestic relations .ases can be clarified to some extent by a
division of the subject into specific areas. The category, domestic
relations, generally includes two facets-status and property rela-
tionships. Many cases involve both aspects but in reality there are
two distinct, perhaps interwoven, but nonetheless different concepts.
The United States Supreme Court has decided four outstanding
domestic relations cases, Barber v. Barber," ' Sins v. Sims,"'
De LaRama v. De LaRaina," 4 and Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
109. Some of the early cases in which wills were construed: Colton v.
Colton, 127 U. S. 300 (1888); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U. S. (17 How.)
369 (1854) (involving problems of jurisdiction over charitable trusts);
Tarver v. Tarver, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 174 (1835) ; Smith v. Bell, 31 U. S.
(6 Pet.) 68 (1832) (majority opinion by Marshall, C.J., does not discuss ajurisdictional problem); Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. 807 (C.C.D.R.I. 1895);
Toms v. Owens, 52 Fed. 417 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1891).
110. Cf. Ferguson v. Patterson, 191 F. 2d 584 (10th Cir. 1951);
Sherman v. American Congressional Ass'n, 113 Fed. 609 (Ist Cir. 1902).
111. Uterhart v. United States, 240 U. S. 598 (1916). This limitation on
the construction of wills does not involve any implied jurisdictional limitations,
but is rather a consequence of the policy of following state law in the con-
struction, there being no clearer expression of the position of the state court
possible than its adjudication with respect to the same instrument. On the
necessity for following state law see President and Fellows of Har%-ard Col-
lege v. Jewett, 11 F. 2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1925) :
This is an Ohio will, and must be construed in accordance with the
statutes and the decisions of the court of last resort of that state in
reference to wills.
112. 62 U. S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
113. 175 U. S. 162 (1899).
114. 201 U. S. 303 (1906).
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.gler. 1 ' These are most frequently quoted and are cited as the
definitive cases in the area of domestic relations. An examination of
the factual situations and the holdings in these cases may be help-
ful in deciding the jurisdictional limitations of the federal courts in
the so-called domestic relations area. Barber v. Barber '" involves
an action, brought by a wife against her husband in Wisconsin. The
wife initiated the action in the federal court in that state alleging
first, diverse citizenship and second, a judgment of a New York
court of competent jurisdiction which had decreed a divorce a
niensa et thoro between the husband and wife and which had allowed
alimony to the wife. The wife claimed that the husband had left
New York for the purpose of placing himself beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court which had handed down the judgment. The United
States Supreme Court held that the husband and wife could in fact
be citizens of different states so that there could be diversity of
citizenship and held that the wife could sue in Wisconsin on the
New York judgment. 1 7 In the course of the opinion the Court
stated :
Our first remark is-and we wish it to be remembered
that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of
alimony. That has been done by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent
that decree from being defeated by fraud.
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts in tle
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance
of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as
an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed andboard."'
This last paragraph, dicta in the case, is much cited as establishing
the law for federal courts in the area of domestic relations. There
was a dissenting opinion in the Barber v. Barber case by Mr. Justice
Daniel, concurred in by Mr. justice Campbell and Chief Justice
Taney." 9 Among other things the dissenters felt that the husband
and wife could not have different residences, therefore, there could
be no diversity of citizenship and thus no jurisdiction in the federal
courts. Beyond that the dissenters felt that the federal government
had no power to "control the duties of the habits of the different
members of private families and their domestic intercourse."
115. 280 U. S. 379 (1930). See also Popovici v. Popovici, 30 F. 2d 185
(N.D. Ohio 1927).
116. 62 U. S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
117. Id. at 592 et seq.
118. Id. at 584.
119. Id. at 600.
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In Sims v. Sims 120 the territorial district court of Arizona enter-
tained a husband's suit for divorce. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, decided the issues for the wife, and gave her alimony and
counsel fees. The territorial supreme court affirmed the decision of
the lower court. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
that court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. In this case,
after citing the dicta from Barber v. Barber, the United State
Supreme Court then continued:
And from that proposition there was no dissent. It may there-
fore be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the
United States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce,
or of claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or
by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such
alimony in a state court. Within the States of the Union, the
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the state, and not to the
laws of the United States.
12 1
The Court then continued and specified that the above restriction
did not apply to suits in territorial courts or appeals to the United
States Supreme Court from such decisions in territorial courts.
The Court in reviewing the decision of the territorial supreme court
indicated that:
So far as the question of divorce was concerned, the matter in
controversy was the continuance or the dissolution of the status
or relation of marriage between the parties, and the decree can-
not be reviewed on this appeal; both because that was a matter
the value of which could not be estimated in money; and be-
cause the refusal of the divorce involved no matter of law, but
mere questions of fact, depending on the evidence, and which
this court is not authorized to refxamine.122
On the other hand the Court viewed the decree for alimony and
counsel fees as severable and stated:
The decree for alimony and counsel fees, although in one
sense an incident to the suit for divorce, is a distinct and sever-
able final judgment in favor of the defendant for a sum of money
of a sufficient jurisdictional amount, and is therefore good
ground of appeal, for the same reason that a judgment for or
against the defendant upon a counter claim of like amount
would support the appellate jurisdiction.1 -
The third case is De LaRamna v. De LaRaina, which was an appeal
from the Supreme Court of the Philippines, where the Supreme
120. 175 U. S. 162 (1899).
121. Id. at 167. To support this proposition the Court cites In re
Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
122. 175 U. S. at 168-69.
123. Id. at 169.
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Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court in a divorce case. 24 In considering the question of
jurisdiction of the Court over divorces, the United States Supreme
Court indicated that any limitation had no application to the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court over appeals from the Philippine
courts. In the course of its decision the Court stated:
It has been a long established rule that the courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction on the subject of divorce, or for
the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery, or an incident of a divorce or separation, both by
reason of fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citi-
zens of different States, so long as the married relation continues
(a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and
for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no
pecuniary value.'25
The Supreme Court of the United States then examined the factual
situation and reversed the holding of the lower court. It should be
noted that four justices dissented on the question of jurisdiction.
The final one of the four oft-quoted, definitive cases is Ohio ex rel.
Popovici v. Agler,12 6 which involved a suit by the wife of the vice-
consul of Romania against her husband for divorce and alimony in
a state court in Ohio. The wife had initially brought an action in a
federal court for divorce but the judge sitting in the district court
had dismissed the action on the grounds that the federal courts had
no jurisdiction in divorce cases. 127 The wife then started an action
for divorce in the state court. The vice-consul then applied to tile
state supreme court for a writ of prohibition to stop the action in
the lower court. This was denied and a petition for writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court was instituted. The United States Supreme
Court held that the state court could grant a divorce where a foreign
consul was involved. In the course of the decision the Court. sug-
gesting that it had ". . . been unquestioned for three-quarters of a
century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction
over divorce." continued,
If when the Constitution vas adopted the conlon understand-
ing was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and
parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is
no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly and not
much in dealing with the statutes. 'Suits against consuls and
vice-consuls' must be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceed-
124. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U. S. 303 (1906).
125. Id. at 307.
126. 280 U. S. 379 (1930), and see also Duran-Ballen v. Duran-Ballen.
180 Visc. 750, 158 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1943).
127. Popovici v. Popovici. 30 F. 2d 185 (N.D. Ohio 1927).
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ings and not to include what formerly would have belonged to
the ecclesiastical Courts.
In the absence of any prohibition in the Constitution or laws
of the United States it is for the State to decide how far it will
go.128
The Court's reasoning can very simply be stated: first, that the
judicial code gives exclusive jurisdiction only when federal courts
have jurisdiction; second, that federal courts have no divorce juris-
diction; and, third, that therefore the state court can grant a
divorce-that is, they have jurisdiction of a divorce action brought
against a vice-consul.129 This decision seems to be based primarily
upon the statute involved here.
It can be seen from these cases that there is no square holding
on the question of the jurisdiction of federal courts over the simple
determination of status in a diversity case. All of these cases in-
volve other crucial factors. It is interesting to note that in each of
four cases the wife involved got exactly what she requested. In
the Barber case, the wife got the judgment in the Wisconsin court;
in the Sims case the wife got her judgment of alimony affirmed and a
denial of the divorce to her husband, since the action of the United
States Supreme Court was in fact an affirmance of the decision of
the lower court on that point. In the De LaRama case the wife got
a reversal of the Philippine decision concerning the divorce. In the
Popovici case the wife got a divorce, which is exactly what she
wanted.
Three reasons to sustain the contention that the federal courts
have no jurisdiction in divorce cases have been vigorously urged:
first, that there is no diversity of citizenship and that there cannot
be; second, that there is no monetary interest involved in the
case ;130 and, third, that the federal courts have not been granted
jurisdiction in this particular type of case. That is, either because of
constitutional or statutory infirmities, the federal courts simply do
not have power in this area. The possibility of diversity of citizen-
ship between husband and wife was considered in Barber v. Barber.
That action was brought by the wife against the husband after a
divorce a inensa et thoro but no divorce a vincido had been granted.
128. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379, 383-84 (1930).
129. A contrary view had been taken in New York state courts. See
Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N. Y. 576 (1853); Higginson v. Higginson, 96
Misc. 457, 158 N. Y. Supp. 92 (Sup. Ct 1916).
130. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27 F. 2d 753 (W.D. Va. 1928)
where at page 755 the court stated: 'But in bills for divorce ... it is not
merely difficult, it is impossible, to make any, even the wildest, approximation
of a value in money of the object sought"
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Dicta in the case seem to indicate that a wife can have a ditferetit
residence from that of the husband even though no divorce at all
has been obtained."' It should be noted also that in the De LaRaina
case the court suggested that the rule concerning the diversity
citizenship between a husband and wife has been "somewhat re-
laxed in recent cases," and a number of recent cases have held that
there can be diversity between husband and wife.132 As for the
jurisdictional amount in divorce cases, certainly a persuasive argu-
ment can be made that a sufficient amount might be involved.","
Concerning the third basis for stating that the federal court,
have no divorce jurisdiction, that is, that the federal courts simply
have no power in this area, the United States Supreme Court ha,
stated that:
When this country was settled, the power to grant a divorce
from the bonds of matrimony was exercised by the Parliament
of England. The eccleciastical courts of that country were limit-
ed to the granting of divorces from bed and board. Naturally.
the legislative assemblies of the colonies followed the example
of Parliament and treated the subject as one within their prov-
ince. And until a recent period legislative divorces have been
granted, with few exceptions, in all the States....
. . . The weight of authority, however, is decidedly in favor of
the position that, in the absence of direct prohibition, the power
over divorces remains with the legislature. We are, therefore.
justified in holding-more, we are compelled to hold, that the
granting of divorces was a rightful subject of legislation accord-
ing to the prevailing judicial opinion of the country, and the
understanding of the profession at the time the organic act of
Oregon was passed by Congress, when either of the parties
divorced was at the time a resident within the territorial juris-
diction of the legislature .... "
As a result of this background in the federal courts, the present
position, correct or incorrect, seems to be that the federal courts
will not exercise jurisdiction where a determination of status is
involved. A number of cases would seem to support this con-
clusion. 3 5
131. Barber v. Barber, 62 U. S. (21 How.) 582, 593-99 (1858)
Patuleia v. Patuleia, 127 F. Supp. 60 (D. Mass. 1955) (wife brought action
against her husband who also had been her guardian).
132. See for example, Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D.
Iowa 1949). Compare text regarding jurisdictional amount in custody cases.
133. See for example, Gonzales v. Gonzales. 83 F. Supp. 496 (E.1).
Pa. 1949). But see Bowman v. Bowman, 30 Fed. 849 (C.C. N.D. Il1. 1887).
134. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 206, 209 (1887).
135. For example, see Hastings v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378 (N.D. W. Va
1918) where the heirs at law brought a suit in equity against the apparent
widow of the decedent seeking to have his last minute marriage declared
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At the same time the courts are deciding questions of status
they can also be deciding questions of property rights of the indi-
viduals involved. These are separate questions that should be
recognized as such. As the United States Supreme Court stated in
discussing a divorce granted by the legislature:
. . . it is not perceived that any principle should prevent the
legislature itself from interfering and putting an end to the
relation in the interest of the parties as well as of society. If the
act declaring the divorce should attempt to interfere with rights
of property vested in either party, a different question would be
presented.13 6 (Emphasis Supplied.)
The courts are frequently faced, however, with questions involv-
ing only the property rights of members of a family where no de-
termination of status is required. Such property rights of members
of a family may come up in a number of different ways. For ex-
ample, Linscott v. Linscott37 involved a contract between a hus-
band and wife. The husband brought an action in a federal district
court asking that the court decree the contract wholly void. An-
other situation where the status is not in issue but property rights
may be involved is in an action for separate maintenance. Garber-
son v. Garberson involved an action brought in a federal district
court.13s The action had originally been commenced in an Iowa state
court and was removed to the Federal District Court for the North-
ern District of Iowa. The defendant in the action was a millionaire,
while the plaintiff wife was a semi-invalid asking for separate main-
tenance. Although these cases generally involve husband and wife,
they can, under certain circumstances, involve conflicts over prop-
erty rights between other members of the family. The recent case of
Bercovitch v. Tanburn 39 was an action brought by a mother-in-law
for moneys expended in taking care of her daughter, the defendant's
wife. Another example, Albanese v. Richter,40 was an action by an
illegitimate child against his putative father for an invalidation of
the instrument which was alleged to be in fraud of the child's rights
void because of mental incapacity and to establish the resulting property
interests. See also McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F. 2d 540 (10th Cir. 1941) and
Calhoun v. Lange, 40 F. Supp. 264 (D. 'Aid. 1941).
There seems to be no question about the right of an individual to sue an
ex-spouse where a divorce has been granted, alimony given and that alimony
has been unpaid by the person against whom the judgment has been granted.
Gullet v. Gullet, 188 F. 2d 719 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 74 F.
Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1947), 83 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1949); cf. Gitlin v.
Gitlin, 15 F. R. D. 458 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
136. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 206 (1887).
137. 98 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
138. 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
139. 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
140. 161 F. 2d 688 (3d Cir. 1947).
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and for the award of a sum necessary for his education and sup-
port. Another case involving a husband and wife is Patulcia v.
I'atuleia'4 where the plaintiff was bringing an accounting action
against her husband and against the surety on his bond as guardian.
The defendant had been appointed the plaintiff's guardian in Cali-
fornia, and there had been a California proceeding discharging the
defendant as a guardian. In all of these cases the question was
whether the federal court loses jurisdiction because of the parties
involved. In all of these it is property rights of various individuals
that are being considered. In the Linscott case the court stated:
Plaintiff flatly argues that this case does not involve domestic
relations. However, so to agree would be to ignore the very,
source of the word. The word 'domestic' is a derivative one.
The relation it implies suggests some relationship to house or
home and extends to things outside of as well as within it. A
home has an exterior as well as an interior and things connected
with it on the outside clearly may be things of or pertaining to it
and the family .... The term 'domestic relation' is to be given
a broad liberal construction and its meaning depends much
upon the connection with which it is used. Its significance must
always be determined with reference to its subject matter and
the relation in which it appears.4 2
In the Albanese case the court stated:
Plaintiff urges that 'domestic relations' does not include the
putative father-illegitimate child relationship. Both New York
and New Jersey, however, have indicated that the parens patriae
doctrine in those states includes illegitimate children as well.
Moreover, we have been unable to find any precedent for a suit
based upon diversity of citizenship, in a federal court by an
illegitimate child against his putative father.
' * * federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the three
causes of action asserted in the complaint .... 143
In the Garberson case the court stated:
... The language of the trial court in Popovici v. Popovici,
supra, seems pertinent here, 30 F.2d at page 186:
'If the question were presented in the absence of such posi-
tive declarations by the Supreme Court of the United States,
and were one of first impression, I would be inclined to the view
141. 127 F. Supp. 60 (D. Mass. 1955).
142. Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Iowa 1951). The
court, at page 804, seemed to use a very mechanical test to determine whether
it was a domestic relations problem. This same type of mechanical reasoning
was revealed in Albanese v. Richter, 161 F. 2d 688 (3d Cir. 1947), where
at page 689, note 1, the court stated:
It should also be noted that the statutes upon which the second and
third causes of action are based appear in domestic relations portions of the
collected laws of each state, and that the right granted by the New Jersey
statute is exactly that enjoyed by legitimate children.
143. Albanese v. Richter, 161 F. 2d 688, 689 (3d Cir. 1947).
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that the case comes within the original jurisdiction of this
court; but it would be presumptuous for an inferior court to
announce a conclusion adverse to that dearly stated by the
Supreme Court on several occasions, on the ground that the high
court opinion was dicta because not necessary to a decision of the
question before it, or that it was not supported by adequate
legal reasons.
'These declarations are in unequivocal language and make
no exception. It will be presumed that the Supreme Court had
in mind and appreciated the full extent of its constitutional and
statutory jurisdiction.'
In view of this well established limitation on the general
jurisdiction of federal courts based on diversity of citizenship,
it is the holding of this Court that the motion to remand the
cause to the District Court of Iowa, in and for \Voodbury
County, be and the same is hereby sustained.14'
It appears that some very serious questions may be raised about
the position adopted by the federal courts where they refused to
exercise jurisdiction simply because of the individuals involved. It
would seem that the court should examine the nature of the action.
If it is purely an action concerning a right to recover a judgment
because of some contractual, quasi-contractual or tortious wrong
that has been committed, the federal court should not decline juri-
diction . 45 The federal courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction
in domestic relations cases only where a problem of status arises.
Where only property rights are involved jurisdiction should be
taken.1 46
Parens Patriae
Another area where the federal courts have found and applied a
limitation on their jurisdiction is in the area of custody of minors
and incompetents. The definitive case is In re Burrus."' A father
had sent his child to his grandparents when the child's mother was
sick. Subsequently the mother died and the father remarried. The
father then sought custody of the child by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the district court on the grounds that the child was
unlawfully detained by the grandparents. The writ issued; the
grandparents were ordered to release the child; they did so but
regained custody by force; the grandfather then was sentenced for
144. Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706, 710 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
145. See Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F. 2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Patuleia v.
Patuleia, 127 F. Supp. 60 (D. Mass. 1955).
146. Having taken jurisdiction, the federal court is then faced with the
question of the law to be applied. The applicable law may not allow a wife
to recover a judgment against her husband. This is quite different, however,
from saying that the court does not have jurisdiction.
147. In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890).
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contempt and he made application for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court
held that the district court was without jurisdiction in the case of
the original writ and that the grandfather was unlawfully detained
and should be released. The Court indicated that its ground for the
holding was that this involved a question of domestic relations. The
Court said:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States. As to the right to the control and
possession of this child, as it is contested by its father and its
grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the Congress
of the United States nor any authority of the United States has
any special jurisdiction. Whether the one or the other is en-
titled to possession does not depend upon any act of Congress.
or any treaty of the United States or its Constitution.""'
Although there may be some question about the basis of the Court's
ruling, it seems that the Court felt that the basis of jurisdiction
asserted here was not diversity of citizenship. As the Court states,
"the jurisdiction of that court, is not founded upon citizenship of
the parties; . . . ." The Court concluded its opinion stating:
Whatever, therefore, may be held to be the powers of the Cir-
cuit Courts in cases of this kind, where necessary citizenship
exists between the contestants, which gives the court jurisdic-
tion of all matters between such parties, both in law and
equity, where the matter exceeds two thousand dollars in value.
we know of no statute, no provision of law, no authority in-
tended to be conferred upon the District Court of the United
States to take cognizance of a case of this kind, either on the
ground of citizenship, or any other ground found in this case.
According to this view of the subject, the whole proceeding be-
fore the District Judge in the District Court was coram non
judice and void, and the attempt to enforce the judgment by
attachment and imprisonment of Burrus for contempt of that
order is equally void. 49
The emphasis of course is upon the district court here because that
court has no jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases, which
could be brought only in the circuit court. '-"
In a note to In re Burrus, the Court included the full opinion of
Judge Betts in In re Barry, a decision in the Circuit Court of the
148. Id. at 593-94.
149. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 596 where it is stated:
• . . it is not pereceived how that averment aids the parties in the
present case, for the District Courts of the United States have not juris-
diction by reason of the citizenship of the parties.
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United States for the Southern District of New York in 1844.11
The fact that it is set out at length in the official United States
Reports would indicate that it has the approval of a least one
justice of the United States Supreme Court. In an extended opinion
the circuit judge set forth the facts of the controversy and then
concluded that the federal court had no jurisdiction in the matter.
. . . this court cannot exercise the common law function of
parens patriae; and has no common law jurisdiction over the
matter; .... 152
The circuit court in support of its conclusion stated that the
United States government does not have the power to regulate the
domestic relations of its citizens.
It is not designed, in its organization or aim, to regulate the
individual or municipal relations of the citizens. These are left
under the dominion of the state government; and there accord-
ingly exists no relation between the nation and the individuals,
which affords foundation for these prerogatives.
The social or personal duties or liabilities of the citizens
come within the control of the general government only when
remitted to its charge by a special cession of authority, and then
solely to the end that such regulations as are of a federal charac-
ter may be enforced,--as in relation to land and naval forces,
and persons in the employ of the United States, the punishment
151. In re Barry, 42 Fed. 113 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1844) (opinion set out
in full in note to In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890) at the request of one of
the justices of the Supreme Court). This decision is one step in the attempt
of Barry, a resident of Nova Scotia and a "subject of the queen of Great
Britain," (42 Fed. at 114) to gain custody of his daughter. In 1839 he
brought habeas corpus proceedings in three different New York state courts.
Only one of these is reported. 8 Paige 46 (1839). In all of these the detention
was held not illegal. Barry was successful, however, on an appeal to thc
state supreme court from one of the above decisions. But on appeal from this
unreported decision, the lower court's decision was reinstated. 25 Wend. 64(1840). Pending the second appeal a writ was sued out in the Superior Court
of New York, and in 1841 it was held that the detention was not illegal.
Barry was successful in a habeas corpus to the supreme court in 1842, 3
Hill. 399 (1842), but this determination was evidently reversed, since Barry
went on to litigate in the federal courts. It is not surprising that an attempt
was made to enjoin Barry's perpetual attempts to obtain custody of his
daughter. The injunction attempt was unsuccessful See 4 Ch. Sent. 113(1844). Apparently despairing of securing relief in the New York courts, in
1844 Barry brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States Supreme Court 43 U. S. (2 How.) 65 (1844). The application was
rejected on jurisdictional grounds. The decision cited at the beginning of
this footnote was then handed down as a result of Barry's petition to the
Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. After losing there onjurisdictional grounds, Barry sued out a writ of error to the United States
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, when his case was called for argument he
was sick, and it was placed at the foot of the docket. He was unsuccessful in
his attempt to secure an argument during the same term. 45 U. S. (4 How.)
574 (1846). Finally, in 1847, his writ of error was dismissed. 46 U. S. (5
How.) 103. Apparently Barry gave up, and returned to Nova Scotia.
152. 136 U. S. at 626. For a discussion of the parens patriae Pou'cr of
the English courts see Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown c. IX (1820).
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of offences, etc.,-but in other respects the national govermnct
does not supply the law governing the citizen in his domestic
or individual capacity. These particulars appertain to the in-
stitutions and policies of the respective States .... 11'
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re
Burrus there have been a number of federal court decisions in child
custody cases and in every case the federal courts have decided that
they do not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. In
Hoadly v. Chase the federal court stated:
I understood Mr. Ketcham to state clearly that if this petition
asked the exercise of the function of parens patriae; invoked that
jurisdiction which the sovereign formerly possessed, and which
now resides, the authorities show, in the states; if the question
before us involved that peculiar jurisdiction-then this court
has no jurisdiction to issue this writ. I think that the proposi-
tion is sound; that if the question now before us belongs to that
jurisdiction, then this court has no jurisdiction.15 4
After an extended discussion in support of the parens patriae argu-
ment, the court then gave a second ground for its decision.
The only claim that is made that gives this court any appear
ance of jurisdiction is the claim that grows out of diverse citizen
ship.... It is well enough to read the statutes and the Constitu-
tion, which in general terms speak of the powers and jurisdictio
of the United States courts, but, after all, these courts have no
jurisdiction except that which is distinctly given. And in refer-
ence to diverse citizenship, in every section, in every clause.
conferring jurisdiction because of diverse citizenship, there i,
included the element of the amount in controversy. Counsel for
petitioner have not pointed out any exception to this. If it he
true that a habeas corpus proceeding brought in a state court,
where the defendant is a nonresident of that state, cannot be
removed to the United States court, because, although being
between citizens of different states, the controversy does not
involve $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the conclusion
seems irresistible that this court is without original jurisdic-
tion. 5
In Clifford v. Williams,"6 the federal court was again faced with
a question of the custody of a child. In this case there were con-
flicting orders from state courts and the question was presented
for decision by a federal court. The court considered the grant of
power to the federal courts and then stated:
If this grant of jurisdiction were absolute and unlimited, there
would be no difficulty in resolving the question now under coi-
153. 136 U. S. at 606.
154. Hoadly v. Chase, 126 Fed. 818,820 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904).
155. Id. at 823.
156. 131 Fed. 100 (C.C.D. Wash. 1904).
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sideration in favor of the court's jurisdiction; but the statute
does not give jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States, nor of all cases
involving controversies between citizens of different states, but
limits the jurisdiction of all such cases by a prescribed amount
of money or pecuniary value involved; and this case cannot be
brought within the terms of that statute, because the right of a
parent to have the custody of a minor child is priceless, and
the value of a person's liberty cannot be estimated in money.157
The most recent case involving the custody of a child is Carque-
rille v. Woodruff,158 in which the court apparently examined the
merits of the controversy and refused to override a state court's
decision concerning the custody of a child. It seems that the
federal court did not place its decision squarely on the basis of the
lack of jurisdiction of the federal court. For example, the court
stated:
The appellants, having failed to exhaust the state remedies
available to them by not seeking a review of the ruling of the
Ohio State Courts by its court of last resort, have no standing
in this proceeding in the Federal District Court.'
The court, however, did use the language found in a number of
other federal cases that:
... the whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife
and parent and child belongs to the jurisdiction of the State
Courts. 60
The problem of custody of incompetents involves the same
considerations of parens patriae and the courts have tended to
reach the same conclusion-lack of jurisdiction-as in the custody
of minor cases.' 6'
157. Id. at 102. See also Ex parte Bell; 240 Fed. 758 (N.D. Cal. 1917).
158. 153 F. 2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1946). See also Albanese v. Richter, 161
F. 2d 688 (3d Cir. 1947) (paren.s patriae concept held to include illegitimate;
court held to have no jurisdiction in action brought to enforce putative
father's obligation to support and educate child born out of wedlock).
159. 153 F. 2d at 1012.
160. Ibid.
161. See for example, In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10, rehearing denied, 47
F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Penn. 1942).
The power of the federal courts over insane persons has been tested
recently by a federal statute providing for confinement of insane criminal
defendants until they are competent to stand trial. 18 U. S. C. § 4246 (1952)
provides that:
Whenever the trial court shall determine... that an accused is or
was mentally incompetent, the court may commit the accused to the cus-
tody of the Attorney General . . . until the accused shall be mentally
competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are
disposed of according to law. And if the court after hearing as provided
in the preceding sections 4244 and 4245 shall determine that the condi-
tions specified in the following section 4247 exist, the commitment shall
be governed by section 4248 as herein provided.
18 U. S. C. § 4247 (1952) deals with confinement of convicted prisoners, and
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The power of federal courts to assume jurisdiction in the area of
custody of children and incompetents may involve a question of the
constitutional power of federal courts rather than a question of the
jurisdiction granted by the applicable statutes. If in fact the states
alone have the power to act as parens patriae, then the problem may
be one not of statutory interpretation, but rather of the Constitution
itself.'62 Of course, questions of custody may be cast in terms of
constitutional rights. When this is done, the federal courts may
have jurisdiction. 33
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
[The Chancellor] is the general guardian of all infants, idiots,
lunatics; and has the general superintendence of all the charita-
ble uses in the kingdom; and all this over and above the vast
18 U. S. C. § 4248 (1952) specifies that the "commitment shall run until the
mental condition is so improved that ... he will not endanger the safety of
the officers . . . of the United States. . . ." Lower federal courts found con-
stitutional difficulties in the statute. Thus in Wells, by Gillig v. Attorney
General, 201 F. 2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953), the statute was construed to apply
only to cases of temporary insanity, in accordance with the maxim that a
construction should be adopted which avoids constitutional questions. In
Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954), it was held that accused
must be discharged if after a reasonable time he is still incompetent to stand
trial. More than one and one-half years was there held to be unreasonable.
However, in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). the
Supreme Court, by Justice Frankfurter, held that the statute applied not
only to temporary mental incompetency but also to mental disability which
seemed more than temporary, and that the statute was constitutional as so
construed. The view of the court is well summarized in a statement at page
375 of 350 U. S.:
The petitioner came legally into the custody of the United States.
The power that put him into such custody-the power to prosecute for
federal offenses-is not exhausted .... [The] commitment, and therefore
the legislation authorizing commitment in the context of this case, involve
an assertion of authority, duly guarded, auxiliary to incontestable national
power. As such it is plainly within congressional power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.
Whatever the policy considerations behind the Greenwood decision, it would
seem that the Court treated the difficult parens patriae problem a bit too
summarily. Furthermore, it is submitted that any decision based upon the
premise that persons accused but not convicted of crime are likely to wreck
havoc if released upon society does violence to the traditional presumption
of innocence. It would appear that Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D.
Mo. 1954), adopted a reasonable solution when they noted that the Attorney
General could hold the defendant either until his insanity was restored or
until suitable arrangements could be made by the state of residence for his
care. The confinement would thus be temporary, lasting until the first of the
two events occurred. For a comment on the circuit decision in the Greenwood
case, see 41 Iowa L. Rev. 303 (1956).
162. The federal courts, of course, do have the power to appoint gnar
dians ad litem. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ginsburg, 228 F. 2d 881 (3d
Cir. 1956), but such authority does not give federal courts general power
over persons or property of incompetents or minors. In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp.
10, rehearing denied, 47 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Penn. 1942) ; Southern Ohio
Say. Bank & Trust v. Guaranty Trust, 27 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
163. See for example, Sklaroff v. Skeadas, 351 U. S. 988 (1956).
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and extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial
capacity in the Court of Chancery. .. 164... The king, as parens
patriae, has the general superintendence of all charities, which
he exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor .... 1 65
Having examined one area of the law, the custody of children
and incompetents, where there is some implied limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the federal courts because of the rights of the
sovereign as the parens patriae, it is appropriate to examine the area
of charitable trusts to determine the extent of the jurisdiction of
the federal courts over such instrumentalities. In one of the first
cases involving charitable trusts to reach the United States Supreme
Court, that court stated:
The 2d section of the 3d article of the constitution declares
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all
cases in law and equity specified in the section. These words
obviously confer judicial power, and nothing more: and can-
not, upon any fair construction, be held to embrace the preroga-
tive powers, which the king, as parens patriae, in England,
exercised through the courts. And the chancery jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, as granted by the constitution,
extends only to cases over which the court of chancery had
jurisdiction, in its judicial character as a court of equity. The
wide discretionary power which the chancellor of England exer-
cizes over infants, lunatics, or idiots, or charities, has not been
conferred.1 66
The Court then continued and indicated that the prerogative powers
which originally belonged to the sovereign as parens pairiac noN%
belonged to the various states. The court suggested that the various
states can exercise control over the subject matter and that they
may require any courts of the state to establish such charities and
to carry them to completion. The Supreme Court, however, indi-
cated that state laws cannot authorize a court of the United States
to exercise any power that is not a judicial power. The Court then
stated that:
For these reasons a court of chancery of the United States must,
... deal with bequests and trusts for charity as they deal with
bequests and trusts for other lawful purposes; and decide
them upon the same principles and by the same rules. And if
the object to be benefited is so indefinite and so vaguely de-
scribed, that the bequest could not be supported in the case of
164. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries an the Laws of England 48 (Ist
Worchester ed. 1790).
165. Id. at 427. For a discussion of the parens patriae power of the
English courts and its relationship to charities, see Chitty, Prerogatives of
the Crown 161 (1820).
166. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U. S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854).
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an ordinary trust, it can not be established in a court of the
United States upon the grounds that it is a charity, And if,
from any cause, the cestui que trust, in an ordinary case of
trust, would be incapable of maintaining a suit in equity to
establish his claim, the same rule must be applied where charity
is the object, and the complainant claims to he recognized as
one of its beneficiaries.";7
This then suggests that a federal court can exercise jurisdiction
over a charitable trust brought to the attention of the court but
that the court cinnot invoke the prerogative cy pres doctrine. In
other words, this restriction may be one concerning the law which
will be applied by the federal courts rather than one concerning
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Certainly the federal courts
have not been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction in the general area
of charitable trusts.1 6 8 There are a number of examples of cases
where the federal courts have, in fact, adjudicated controversies
involving such trusts. In the outstanding case, however, where the
question of the cy pres doctrine arose in a federal court, that court
stated :
• . . the doctrine is laid down that in this country the preroga-
tives of the crown devolved upon the people of the states : that
the states as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. In this connection
I do not overlook the distinction between the exclusive preroga-
tive of the crown in applying the cy pres rule in England, and
administered by the courts of equity in the LUnited States. Ai
exhaustive examination of the authoritives convinces me that
the expression 'parens patriae' is applicable in both instances.
In England the chancellor, acting under the sign manual of
the king, and executing the prerogative of the king, admninis-
tered certain charities not recognizable judicially by courts of
equity. Such prerogative power has never been granted nor
assumed by courts of equity in this country. However. courts of
equity in the several states, in pursuance of the public policy and
law of such states, do administer public charities of the kind here
under consideration, at the instance of the state as parents pat riae :
that is to say, it is generally recognized in this country that
public charities are ultimately represented in the courts by the
state in some form, when the stage has been reached that the
particular object of the charity has, or is about to fail ...
.... Neither upon the briefs of counsel, nor as a result of a long
and I think thorough independent search of the authorities.
have I been able to find an instance where a federal court ha,
167. Id. at 395-96.
168. See for example, Jones v. Habershani. 107 U. S. 174 (1882):
Girard v. Philadelphia, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 1 (1868) ; Vidal v. Mayor, 43
U. S. (2 How.) 127 (1844) ; King v. Richardson, 136 F. 2d 849 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 777 (1943) Nicholson v. Citizens and Southern
Nat'l Bank. 50 F. Stipp. 92 (S.D. Ga. 1943).
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ever perpetuated and administered a public charity with its
situs within a state by application of the cy pres doctrine.109
It is interesting to note that in this case the court did not dismiss
the action without giving any relief at all, but indicated that an
order would be handed down that the status quo should be main-
tained until an action should commence in a proper tribunal to
obtain judicial approval of the plan proposed by the parties. Here,
then, there would seem to be a limitation upon the law to be ap-
plied, but not upon the essential jurisdiction of the court in such
matters.
CONCLUSION
There are some cases litigated in federal courts wherein ques-
tions are raised that cannot properly be decided by those courts-
the so-called "political questions."'7 0 In some cases the courts simply
proceed to a final adjudication in the controversy, taking decisions
of fact issues made by some other governmental agency as conclu-
sive. The courts refuse to consider the validity of the challenged
decision because of the nature of the question."' In other cases,
when a controversy involves only an attempt to challenge the pro-
priety of a decision of a "political question" by a governmental
agency, a court may say that the controversy is beyond its juris-
diction and that a definitive decision cannot be made by a court. ' "
Although these two situations are somewhat different-in one, the
169. Schell v. Leander Clark College, 10 F. 2d 542, 554-57 (N.D.
Iowa 1926). But see, United States v. 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 692
(N.D. Calif. 1944) wherein the federal court applied the cy pres doctrine.
170. For emmple, see Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948) ; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549
(1946) ; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939) ; Pacific States Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912). Compare, with the
Colegrove case, Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (Hawaii 1956), and
Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (redistricting suit dis-
missed for want of equity). See also Post, The Supreme Court and Political
Questions (1936) ; Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39
Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1925) ; Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev.
296 (1925); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338
(1924). An area where this doctrine is found only in an incipient stage i3
the conflict between the civilian and the military. The seeds of a doctrine
of judicial abdication in the face of the military can be found. See for ex-
ample, Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty under Law, 1 Buffalo L. Rev.
103, 115 (1951); Mason, Itster Arina Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's
View, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1956).
171. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) ; United States
v. National City Bank, 40 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); and The S.S.
Denny, 40 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1941).
172. Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 U. S. 103 (1948) ; and see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939).
Note particularly the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black at page 456
and the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter at page 460.
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court accepting a fact as established conclusively because of the
nature of the question; in the other, the court refusing to exercise
jurisdiction because some other appropriate governmental body has
made the decision-they are simply two facets of a single concept.
Although, perhaps, correctness might call for a somewhat different
articulation, courts do occasionally verbalize the doctrine in terms
of jurisdiction. 17 3
A final category which should be mentioned is the so-called
.'penal statute" limitation. All courts, federal as well as state, have
refused to enforce the penal statutes of states other than the forum
state.'-- On its face, this limitation seems to be rather clear: tile
difficulty arises in determining what provisions are in fact penal.
The test has been articulated in terms of whether the wrong sought
to be redressed is a wrong to the public or to an individual.'-, In
other cases the verbalization is in terms of the interests being
furthered; if the interests of a foreign state are being furthered,
then the action cannot be maintained. " A third criterion would
classify statutes as penal or not depending on whether an executive
has the power to pardon and would not include as penal those
statutes giving private action to individuals against wrongdoers.TT
173. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d
246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 772 (1947), where at page 252 the
court states:
As it stands, the District Court had no power to proceed; and, while
it may not be proper, stricti juris, to say it had no jurisdiction, that is
a mere question of words. It is enough that the court was powerless to
move in it.
See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946), and the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Rutledge. Quite clearly the court was split on characterizing
the matter as jurisdictional.
See also Rutledge, When is a Political Question Justiciable?. 9 Ga. lar
J. 394 (1947).
174. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892) ; Gwin v. Breedlove,
43 U. S. (2 How.) 29 (1844) ; Western Fruit Growers v. United States, 124
F. 2d 381 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Pryce v. Swedish-American Lines. 30 F. Supp.
371 (S.D. N.Y. 1939). For a discussion of the enforcement of penal provi-
sions, see Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, §§ 41-42 (1931);
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government Clains, 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 193 (1932). Concerning the right or duty of one jurisdiction to
enforce the tax statutes of another, see Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935), and compare Kotsonaros v. Minnesota, 79 Ariz.
368 (1955). On the question of enforcement of federal penal provisions by
state courts see 28 U. S. C. § 1355 (1952), and 23 Am. Jur., Forfeiturcs and
Penzalties, § 56 and 23 Am. Jur. Cum. Supp. 29-30 (1956).
175. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 206 F. 2d 671, rev'd, 208 F. 2d 310(6th Cir. 1953); Abercrombie v. United Light and Power Co., 7 F. Supp.
530 (D. Md. 1934).
176. Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 136 F. 2d 197 (3d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 757 (1943).
177. Jos. Riedel Glass Works v. Keegan, 43 F. Supp. 153 (D. Me.
1942).
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Quite clearly, then, there is some question about the nature of the
action in some situations . 1 7 Here again the question of Erie Rail-
road might properly be raised. It might be argued quite persuasively
that a forum state court's determination of whether a particular
action was penal might bind the federal court sitting in that state.
In various fields, it becomes apparent that, although the lan-
guage of the grant of power under diversity citizenship cases seems
to be extremely broad, in fact the federal courts are very definitely
limited in the jurisdiction that they can and do exercise. It is quite
apparent that these restrictions are based upon a number of different
considerations. There is no single thread running through the entire
group of cases, but there are a number of restricting factors to be
considered. Moreover, it seems that there are growing and diminish-
ing considerations. Certain doctrines may be withering while others
are gaining impetus as the years pass. It does seem fair to state,
however, that the federal courts, in diversity cases, are not rigidly
bound to the practice of the state in which the federal court is sitting.
In many situations the federal courts make decisions regarding the
exercise of jurisdiction quite different from the decisions that would
be made by a state court sitting in exactly the same case. It seems
quite certain that for all practical purposes the state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in certain areas. Finally it seems quite ap-
parent that this is not an area controlled by the discretion of the
district courts, but rather is an area where there are some absolutes
which foreclose the use of the federal courts in certain types of
litigation.
178. See for example, Tucker v. Cutler, 185 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir., 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 933 (1951), and cases cited therein.
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